

AMBASSADOR KURUSU'S REPORT, 5 June 1942Foreign Office  
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1. Details of the visit to America

At midnight on MEIJI-SYTSU Anniversary '3 November' 1941, being sent for by a special messenger unexpectedly, I went to the official residence of the Foreign Minister.

Those present upstairs were Foreign Minister TOGO, Vice-Minister NICHII and Chiefs of the bureaus or sections in charge of the matters concerning the negotiations with America and it seemed that an important conference had just been concluded. After roughly describing the present state of the negotiations with America, the Foreign Minister asked me to go to America as a special envoy to make a last effort to settle the negotiations.

According to the Minister's explanation the relations between Japan and America were, not to mince matters, in a critical state; that is, the American attitude in the negotiations was as obstinate and firm as ever, giving no evidences of compromise. On the other hand, the economic pressure of America had grown more and more serious till the circumstances did not permit any further delay 'in taking' a resolute step to meet it; besides, the relative deployments of the military forces of the two countries were taking a very delicate turn, and the little time left for solving the situation was growing less and less and the 'common' ground 'for agreement' was steadily shrinking. Sending an envoy to America, for example, must be completely given up for the time being in view of the current interruption of communications, and so on. Such were the circumstances mentioned 'by the Minister'. But according to the Foreign Minister's explanation, if it were fortunately possible to fly over the Pacific in a "Clipper" through the cooperation of the U.S. Government, it was estimated that after my arrival in the United States there would be still some more days left, scanty as they were, for negotiation. And on the other hand, as I judged that the two proposals, A and B, which had been shown in private at the meeting as the last proposals of our country, were comparatively simple in formula and that I might be able to pave the way for the solution of the situation, or might at least gain an inkling of America's final intentions which had been always a matter of doubt to

us, so I ventured to reply that I would undertake the important duty. Needless to say, the whole nation should arise as one man to face and overcome the serious situation which has been almost unprecedented in our country, but it is my long cherished opinion that true national solidarity which is to be established voluntarily by the will of all classes of the nation should not be sought by pressure, and that such solidarity may be established only when the whole people are well acquainted with the fact that our country has been doing her best to the last moment to exhaust every means for the maintenance of peace. Moreover, there wasn't, of course, time to look for the most suitable man deliberately at the critical moment, and it was also extremely difficult to trouble an elder experienced senior in view of the mode of travel planned at that time. Such being the circumstances, I came to the conclusion that there was no other way but to undertake the task myself. Then I asked him 'the Minister' to choose a suitable secretary to accompany me who was well-informed of the progress of the negotiations up to that time. The Vice-Minister and others talked the matter over, and as a result, they informally decided to trouble Shiroji YUKI, former Chief of the First Section of the Bureau of American Affairs. And as to securing seats in the airplane, Section Chief Mr. KASE was to promptly ask Ambassador Crew to use his influence. Thus, the main arrangements having been made, I received the important documents related to the matter and returned home. Having a crowd of emotions in my heart, I tried to get some sleep.

On the following morning, from a further investigation of the documents concerned and from hearing of the competent officials' explanations, I became acquainted with the outline of the circumstances under which the negotiations which had progressed comparatively well till then had come suddenly to a deadlock owing to the advance of the Japanese troops into French Indo-China and learned that the most difficult points in this negotiation lay (1) in the problem of evacuation from China (2) in the open-door problem in China, and (3) in the problem of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister TOGO reported to the Throne through the Prime Minister that I was to be sent to the U.S.A., and by the official concerned I was informed that the Ambassador of the U.S.A. had readily consented to use his good offices and had cabled to the State Department calling for its approval regarding the said question. In the afternoon the American Government gave a reply that it would reserve a seat for me in the "Clipper" and that the plane would wait for me at Hongkong postponing her departure for two days. Now all the arrangements for my leaving for America had been completed.

Then, after having made various arrangements with Foreign Minister TOGO, I called on Premier TOJO at the War Minister's official residence and, as special envoy to America, I asked the Premier, whom I was meeting for the first time, to give his instructions. The Premier told me, recalling reverently to the mind what His Majesty had told him



at the time of his report to the Throne, that His Majesty had been graciously pleased to ask questions about my health, and I shed tears of gratitude. Of course, the Premier fell in with the Foreign Minister's view that it would be very difficult for me to accomplish my mission, but he expected that America would not wish the commencement of hostilities rashly in view of the fact that (1) the preparations for the two-ocean operations were insufficient, that (2) the whole American people had not yet approved of war, and that (3) important national defense materials such as rubber, tin, and so forth, had not sufficiently been provided for, and it was his opinion that we should not conclude that there would be absolutely no possibility of concluding the negotiations, and that the probability of success to failure was as three to seven. He then emphasized that, of the three difficult points in the negotiations, the problem on the withdrawal of troops would admit of no concession whatsoever, and that in view of the various circumstances no postponement of more than a certain period of time would be permitted for the concluding of negotiations. I said good-bye to him after asking a few questions on some important points and giving my frank views on national unity. I then made a farewell visit to the American Ambassador, an old friend of mine, to thank him for his kind services in arranging a plane seat for me. He asked me if I were taking any new proposal with me. At my answer "no", he looked much disappointed and frankly expressed the view as an old acquaintance that if such be the case, there was no necessity of my taking the trouble of going over to America. On this, I told him that if we had a capital plan that would immediately save the situation under the current acute situation as the Ambassador expected, an immediate wire to Washington would save my going to America. However, it was our Imperial Government's aim to try every possible means to maintain peace. For instance, as both the American and the Japanese negotiators in Washington had repeatedly discussed the same points at issue for more than six months in the past, we should not be able to guarantee, humanly speaking, that the points of their observation had not become stereotyped and, to my thinking, there might still be some chance that my participation would lead to a somewhat new phase.

The Ambassador seemed to have understood me. On my leaving, the Ambassador called in Mrs. Grew whom I had known for a long time and we shook hands. She was moved to tears finally. Considering that Mr. and Mrs. Grew had been in Japan for a long time endeavoring to promote the relations between America and Japan, I did not find it hard to enter into their feelings. After that, the same night, I called on ex-Foreign Minister ARITA to exchange opinions with him and heard some very important home news from him. In reply to his question I expressed my opinion as to any possible development in the military operation plan. On my way home, I further visited Mr. Tageru YOSHIDA and after exchanging views with him, returned home at two a.m., and took a nap. At four in the morning, I left home for Tokyo Station. I went to Oopama with Secretary YUKI and confidential Secretary SPIMAZU by the first train on the Yokosuka Line. After a short rest, we got in a middle sized Navy bomber and flew straight to Formosa. At 4 p.m. we reached

Okayama Airfield near Takao. The grand spectacle of Navy planes flying side by side overawed the airfield and made a deep impression upon me.



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EXHIBIT No.

昭和十七年六月五日稿

來 栖 大 使 報 告

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1. P.S. Doc. No. 3126A

所たか國民を脅、哀こより油断トシテ盛リ上り来ふか  
や其眞、國民結束、決意之ヲ強壓ニ托ルカニ夫國  
民、全部ヲミテ我國が最後、瞬間ニ至リ迄平和保  
持、有有ニ手段ヲ盡シタルヲ明知タルニ依リテ  
！ニ始テテ達成ヲ期シ得ベキナリト、本使從來、主張  
たニ加ヘ、事態急迫セル今日、辭ヲ最適ニ看テ物色證  
衡ス、皇太子ハ勿論、計画モウツルハ旅ヲ、方法ニ鑑ミ  
老斷練達、先輩ヲ頑ハスルハキコト又至難ニミテ、結  
局本使於テ引退セル、外キヲ遺憾セル結果ナリ。

(以下次頁)

L.R.S. Dec. 31/26 A

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Q.

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敗七分位、(前記)とあり。唯前記(文)に「難貴  
中撤兵、問題、新に譲り、餘地、キコト及諸般  
ノ關係ニ鑑ミ交渉ヲ母結ニ一定期間以上ノ遷延ヲ  
許サレ事情ヲ力説シタリ。乃チ本使ヨリ二三重  
要點ニ付ヒ質問シ且舉國一致ニ固スルニ心算ナ  
キ見見テ困難ニ上テ辭去ル次ニ舊知ノ米國文  
使ヲ訪問飛行機座席幹設、タカク謝シ且暇之  
ヲ述ベタル處同大使ハ本使カ何か新ニ提案ヲ提  
行スルモナレヤ質問シ本使カ之ヲ否定セルニ對シ頗  
ル失望ノ面ヲ示シ斯ク、如クニハ能ク渡米セ  
ラルニ希望スルヲ觀測セラルニ曰ク舊知ノ間柄ナリ、  
無遠慮ニ申述セタルヲ以テ本使ハ事能心煩ル言  
迫セル今日ニ於テ貴大使ノ期待タラニカ如キ何國  
ノ急速打開ノ妙策ナリトハ敢テ本使ハ渡米ヲ任  
シ延モナク即刻葉成豐損ニ打電セル事足ルベキ助  
合ト思考セラルニ。

(以下次頁)

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唯帝國政府トテハ此際平和保持、為總ヲ要ヤントスル趣旨ニテ例ハ華府ニ於ケル日米雙方、交渉当事者共ニ過去半歲餘、之ニキニ亘リ、同論點ヲ繰返シ論議シ來ルニ關係ナキ、觀望自然ニ種ノ型ニ嵌リ來ルガ如キト人間トシテ絶無ナルヲ保ニ難カルベク、幸ヒ本使ノ參加ニ依リ交渉多クナリトモ新生面ヲ發見シ得ルガ如キト或ハナキニシモ非ザルベシト考ヘ居ル次第ナリト應酬セル處、大使ニ納得スル所ナリタルモノ、如シ。辭去ニ際シ舊知、大使夫人ヲモ招ビ來リ交シ本使ト固ク握リ、夫人、如キハ遂ニ港返數行ニ及ベリ。蓋シ同大使夫妻が多年本邦ニ在勤シ日米國交増進ニ盡瘁シ來ルニ経緯ヲ思ヘバ、同氏夫妻ノ胸中モ亦推測ニ難カラズ。

同夜更ニ引續キ有田前外相ヲ訪問意見ヲ交換國內方面、重大消息ヲ聽取シタル上、同氏ノ質問ニ應ビ作戰計畫進捗、場合ニ關スル本使ノ心境ヲ披瀝ス。

歸途更ニ引續キ吉田氏氏ヲモ訪問意見ヲ交換午前三時歸宅假睡、午四時出發東京駅、向シ結城書記官、島津祕書官等ト預須賀線一番列車ヨリ追濱ニ至リ、少憩後海軍中型爆撃機ニ便乘一路台灣ニ向ヒ午後四時高雄附近、岡山飛行場ニ達ス。

翼ヲ連ネタル海軍航空機、雄姿飛行場ヲ壓シ切々トシテ胸ヲ打ツモノアリ。

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